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Abstract—Searchable Encryption (SE) is a technique that
allows Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) to search over encrypted
datasets without learning the content of queries and records. In
recent years, many SE schemes have been proposed to protect
outsourced data from CSPs. Unfortunately, most of them leak
sensitive information, from which the CSPs could still infer
the content of queries and records by mounting leakage-based
inference attacks, such as the count attack and file injection attack.
In this work, first we define the leakage in searchable en-
crypted databases and analyse how the leakage is leveraged in
existing leakage-based attacks. Second, we propose a Privacy-
preserving Multi-cloud based dynamic symmetric SE (SSE)
scheme for relational Database (P-McDb). P-McDb has minimal
leakage, which not only ensures confidentiality of queries and
records, but also protects the search, access, and size patterns
from CSPs. Moreover, P-McDb ensures both forward and back-
ward privacy of the database. Thus, P-McDb could resist existing
leakage-based attacks, e.g., active file/record-injection attacks. We
give security definition and analysis to show how P-McDb hides
the aforementioned patterns. Finally, we implemented a prototype
of P-McDb and test it using the TPC-H benchmark dataset. Our
evaluation results show the feasibility and practical efficiency of
P-McDb.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a successful paradigm offering compa-
nies and individuals virtually unlimited data storage and com-
putational power at very attractive costs. However, uploading
sensitive data, such as medical, social, and financial informa-
tion, to public cloud environments is still a challenging issue
due to security concerns. In particular, once such data sets
and related operations are uploaded to cloud environments,
the tenants must therefore trust the Cloud Service Providers
(CSPs). Yet, due to possible cloud infrastructure bugs [2],
misconfigurations [3] and external attacks [4], the data could
be disclosed or corrupted. Searchable Encryption (SE) is an
effective approach that allows organisations to outsource their
databases and search operations to untrusted CSPs, without
compromising the confidentiality of records and queries.
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Since the seminal SE paper by Song et al. [5], a long line of
work has investigated SE schemes with flexible functionality
and better performance [6]–[9]. These schemes are proved
to be secure in certain models under various cryptographic
assumptions. Unfortunately, a series of more recent work
[10]–[15] illustrates that they are still vulnerable to inference
attacks, where malicious CSPs could recover the content of
queries and records by (i) observing the data directly from
the encrypted database and (ii) learning about the results and
queries when users access the database.
From the encrypted database, the CSP might learn the
frequency information of the data. From the search operation,
the CSP is able to know the access pattern, i.e., the records
returned to users in response to given queries. The CSP can
also infer if two or more queries are equivalent, referred to
as the search pattern, by comparing the encrypted queries or
matched data. Last but not least, the CSP can simply log the
number of matched records or files returned by each query,
referred to as the size pattern.
When an SE scheme supports insert and delete operations,
it is referred to as a dynamic SE scheme. Dynamic SE
schemes might leak extra information if they do not support
forward privacy and backward privacy properties. Lacking
forward privacy means that the CSP can learn if newly
inserted data or updated data matches previously executed
queries. Missing backward privacy means that the CSP learns
if deleted data matches new queries. Supporting forward and
backward privacy is fundamental to limit the power of the
CSP to collect information on how the data evolves over time.
However, only a few schemes [16]–[19] ensure both properties
simultaneously.
Initiated by Islam et al. (IKK) [10], more recent works
[11]–[14] have shown that such leakage can be exploited to
learn sensitive information and break the scheme. Naveed
et al. [11] recover more than 60% of the data in CryptDB
[8] using frequency analysis only. Zhang et al. [13] further
investigate the consequences of leakage by injecting chosen
files into the encrypted storage. Based on the access pattern,
they could recover a very high fraction of searched keywords
by injecting a small number of known files. Cash et al. [12]
give a comprehensive analysis of the leakage in SE solutions
for file collection and introduced the count attack, where an
adversary could recover queries by counting the number of
matched records even if the encrypted records are semantically
secure.
In this article, we investigate the leakage and attacks against
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2relational databases1 and present a Privacy-preserving Multi-
cloud based dynamic SSE scheme for Databases (P-McDb).
P-McDb can effectively resist attacks based on the search,
size or/and access patterns. Our key technique is to use three
non-colluding cloud servers: one server stores the data and
performs the search operation, and the other two manage re-
randomisation and shuffling of the database for protecting the
access pattern. A user with access to all servers can perform
an encrypted search without leaking the search, access, or size
pattern. When updating the database, P-McDb also ensures
both forward and backward privacy. We give full proof of
security against honest-but-curious adversaries and show how
P-McDb can hide these patterns effectively.
The contributions of this article can be summarised as
follows:
• We provide leakage definition specific to searchable
encrypted databases, and then review how existing attacks
leverage the leakage to recover queries and records.
• We propose a privacy-preserving SSE database P-McDb,
which protects the search, access, and size patterns,
and achieves both forward and backward privacy, thus
ensuring protection from leakage-based attacks.
• We give full proof of security against honest-but-curious
adversaries and show how P-McDb can effectively hide
these patterns and resist leakage-based attacks.
• Finally, we implement a prototype of P-McDb and show
its practical efficiency by evaluating its performance on
TPC-H dataset.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. In Section II,
we define notations. We present the leakage levels in SE
schemes and review leakage-based attacks in Section III. In
Section IV, we provide an overview of P-McDb. Solution
details can be found in Section V. In Section VI, we analyse
the security of P-McDb. Section VII reports the performance
of P-McDb. Finally, we conclude this article in Section VIII.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we give formal definitions for the search,
access, and size patterns, as well as for forward and backward
privacy. Before that, in Table I, we define the notations used
throughout this article.
Definition 1 (Search Pattern). Given a sequence of q queries
Q = (Q1, . . . , Qq), the search pattern of Q represents the
correlation between any two queries Qi and Qj , i.e., {Qi ?=
Qj}Qi,Qj∈Q2, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q.
In previous works, access pattern is generally defined as
the records matching each query [7], i.e., the search result.
In fact, in leakage-based attacks, such as [10], [12], [13],
the attackers leverage the intersection between search results
(explained in Section III-B) to recover queries, rather than
each single search result. Therefore, in this work, we define
the intersection between search results as access pattern.
1In the rest of this article, we use the term database to refer to a relational
database.
2Qi = Qj only when Qi.type = Qj .type, Qi.f = Qj .f , Qi.op = Qj .op
and Qi.e = Qj .e
TABLE I
NOTATION AND DESCRIPTION
Notation Description
e Data element
|e| The length of data element
F Number of attributes or fields
rcdid = (eid,1, . . . , eid,F ) The id-th record
N Number of records in the database
DB = {rcd1, . . . , rcdN} Database
DB(e) = {rcdid|e ∈ rcdid} Records containing e in DB
O(e) = |DB(e)| Occurrence of e in DB
Uf = ∪{eid,f} The set of distinct elements in field f
U = {U1, ..., UF } All the distinct elements in DB
e∗ Encrypted element
Ercd Encrypted record
EDB Encrypted database
Q = (type, f, e) Query
Q.type ‘select’ or ‘delete’
Q.f Identifier of interested field
Q.e Interested keyword
EQ Encrypted query
EDB(EQ) or EDB(Q) Search result of Q
(f, g) Group g in field f
Ef,g Elements included in group (f, g)
τf,g = max{O(e)}e∈Ef,g Threshold of group (f, g)
(Ef,g, τf,g)
∗ Ciphertext of (Ef,g, τf,g)
We say EQ(Ercd) = 1 when Ercd matches EQ. Thus, the search result
EDB(EQ) = {Ercdid|EQ(Ercdid) = 1}.
Definition 2 (Access Pattern). The access pattern of Q
represents the intersection between any two search results, i.e.,
{EDB(Qi) ∩ EDB(Qj)}Qi,Qj∈Q.
Definition 3 (Size Pattern). The size pattern of Q rep-
resents the number of records matching each query, i.e.,
{|DB(Qi)|}Qi∈Q.
Definition 4 (Forward Privacy). Let Ercdt be an encrypted
record inserted or updated at time t, a dynamic SE scheme
achieves forward privacy, if EQ(Ercdt) ?= 0 is always true
for any query EQ issued at time t∗, where t∗ < t.
Definition 5 (Backward Privacy). Let Ercdt be an encrypted
record deleted at time t, a dynamic SE scheme achieves
backward privacy, if EQ(Ercdt) ?= 0 is always true for any
query EQ issued at time t′, where t < t′.
III. LEAKAGE AND ATTACKS
A. Leakage Definition
In [12], Cash et al. define four different levels of leakage
profiles for encrypted file collections according to the method
of encrypting files and the data structure supporting encrypted
search. Yet, we cannot apply these definitions to databases
directly, since the structure of a file is different from that of
a record in the database. In particular, a file is a collection of
related words arranged in a semantic order and tagged with
a set of keywords for searching; whereas, a record consists
of a set of keywords with predefined attributes. Moreover, a
keyword may occur more than once in a file, and different
keywords may have different occurrences; whereas, a keyword
of an attribute generally occurs only once in a record. Inspired
by the leakage levels defined in [12], in this section, we
provide our own layer-based leakage definition for encrypted
databases. Specifically, we use the terminology leakage to refer
to the information the CSP can learn about the data directly
3from the encrypted database and the information about the
results and queries when users are accessing the database.
The simplest type of SE scheme for databases is encrypting
both the records and queries with Property-Preserving En-
cryption (PPE), such as the DETerministic (DET). In DET-
based schemes, the same data has the same ciphertext once
encrypted. In this type of SE schemes, the CSP can check
whether each record matches the query efficiently by just
comparing the corresponding ciphertext; however, these so-
lutions result in information leakage. Specifically, in DET-
based schemes, such as CryptDB [8] (where the records
are protected only with the PPE layer), DBMask [9], and
Cipherbase [20], before executing any query, the CSP can learn
the data distribution, i.e., the number of distinct elements and
the occurrence of each element, directly from the ciphertext
of the database. Formally, we say the data distribution of
DB is leaked if e∗ and e have the same occurrence, i.e.,
O(e) = O(e∗), for each e ∈ U . We define this leakage profile
set as L3:
• L3 = {O(e)}e∈U .
The second type of SE for databases encrypts the data with
semantically secure primitives, but still encrypts the queries
with DET encryption. By doing so, the data distribution is
protected, and the CSP can still search the encrypted database
efficiently by repeating the randomisation over the DET query
and then comparing it with the randomised data, as done in
[21], Arx [22], and most of the Public-key Encryption with
Keyword Search (PEKS) systems, such as [23] and BlindSeer
[24]. However, after executing a query, the CSP could still
learn the access and size patterns. Moreover, due to the DET
encryption for queries, the search pattern is also leaked. Given
a sequence of q queries Q = (Q1, . . . , Qq), we define the
leakage profile as:
• L2 = {|DB(Qi)|, {EDB(Qi) ∩ EDB(Qj), Qi ?=
Qj}Qj∈Q}Qi∈Q
Note that after executing queries, PPE-based databases also
leak the profiles included in L2.
A more secure SE solution leverages Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [25], [26] or combines Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) [27], [28] with oblivious data retrieval to hide the search
and access patterns. For instance, the HE-based PPQEDa
proposed by Samanthula et al. [29] and the ORAM-based
SisoSPIR given by Ishai et al. [30] hide both the search and
access patterns. Unfortunately, in both schemes, the CSP can
still learn how many records are returned to the user after
executing a query, i.e., the communication volume. According
to [14], the HE-based and ORAM-based SE schemes have
fixed communication overhead between the CSP and users.
Specifically, the length of the message sent from the CSP
to the user as the result of query execution is proportional
to the number of records matching the query. Based on this
observation, the CSP can still infer the size pattern. Thus, the
HE-based and ORAM-based SE schemes are vulnerable to
size pattern-based attacks, e.g., count attack [12]. The profile
leaked in HE-based and ORAM-based SE schemes can be
summarised below:
• L1 = {|DB(Qi)|}Qi∈Q.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF LEAKAGE PROFILES AND ATTACKS AGAINST ENCRYPTED
DATABASES
Leakage Schemes Attacks
L3
CryptDB [8]
DBMask [9]
Cipherbase [20]
Monomi [31]
Seabed [32]
Frequency analysis attack
IKK attack
Count attack
Record-injection attack
L2
Asghar et al. [6]
Blind Seer [24], [33]
Arx [22]
PPQED [29]
IKK attack
Count attack
Record-injection attack
L1 PPQEDa [29]SisoSPIR [30] Count attack
B. Attacks against SE Solutions
In recent years, leakage-based attacks against SE schemes
have been investigated in the literature. Table II summarises
the existing SE solutions for relational databases and the
attacks applicable to them. In the following, we illustrate how
the existing leakage-based attacks could recover the data and
queries. Specifically, for each attack, we analyse its leveraged
leakage, required knowledge, process, and consequences.
1) Frequency Analysis Attack: In [11], Naveed et al. de-
scribe an attack on PPE-based SE schemes, where the CSP
could recover encrypted records by analysing the leaked
frequency information, i.e., data distribution. To succeed in
this attack, in addition to the encrypted database, the CSP also
requires some auxiliary information, such as the application
background, publicly available statistics, and prior versions of
the targeted database. In PPE-based SE schemes, the frequency
information of an encrypted database is equal to that of the
database in plaintext. By comparing the leaked frequency
information with the obtained statistics relevant to the appli-
cation, the CSP could recover the encrypted data elements
stored in encrypted databases. In [11], Naveed et al. recovered
more than 60% of records when evaluating this attack with
real electronic medical records using CryptDB. We stress that
this attack does not require any queries or interaction with
users. The encrypted databases with L3 leakage profile, i.e.,
PPE-based databases, such as CryptDB and DBMask, are
vulnerable to this attack.
2) IKK Attack: IKK attack proposed by Islam et al. [10] is
the first attack exploiting the access pattern leakage. The goal
of the IKK attack is to recover encrypted queries in encrypted
file collection systems, i.e., recover the plaintext of searched
keywords. Note that this attack can also be used to recover
queries in encrypted databases since it does not leverage the
leakage specific to file collections. In this attack, the CSP
needs to know possible keywords in the dataset and the
expected probability of any two keywords appearing in a file
(i.e., co-occurrence probability). Formally, the CSP guesses
m potential keywords and builds an m×m matrix C˜ whose
element is the co-occurrence probability of each keyword pair.
The CSP mounts the IKK attack by observing the access
pattern revealed by the encrypted queries. Specifically, by
checking if any two queries match the same files or not, the
number of files containing any two searched keywords (i.e.,
the co-occurrence rate) can be reconstructed. Assume the CSP
4observes n queries. It constructs an n × n matrix C with
their co-occurrence rates. By using the simulated annealing
technique [34], the CSP can find the best match between C˜
and C and map the encrypted keywords to the guesses. In
[10], Islam et al. mounted the IKK attack over the Enron
email dataset [35] and recovered 80% of the queries with
certain vocabulary sizes. The encrypted relational databases
with leakage profile L2 or L1, such as Arx [22], Blind Seer
[33], and PPQED [29], are also vulnerable to the IKK attack.
3) File-injection and Record-injection Attack: The file-
injection attack [13] is an active attack mounted on encrypted
file collections, which is also named as chosen-document
attack in [12]. The file-injection attack attempts to recover
encrypted queries by exploiting access pattern in encrypted
file storage. More recently, Abdelraheem et al. [15] extended
this attack to encrypted databases and defined it as record-
injection attack. Compared with the IKK and count attack (will
be discussed in Section III-B4), much less auxiliary knowledge
is required: the CSP only needs to know the keywords universe
of the system. In [13], Zhang et al. presented the first concrete
file-injection attack and showed that the encrypted queries can
be revealed with a small set of injected files. Specifically,
in this attack, the CSP (acting as an active attacker) sends
files composed of the keywords of its choice, such as emails,
to users who then encrypt and upload them to the CSP,
which are called injected files. If no other files are uploaded
simultaneously, the CSP can easily know the storage location
of each injected file. Moreover, the CSP can check which
injected files match the subsequent queries. Given enough
injected files with different keyword combinations, the CSP
could recover the keyword included in a query by checking the
search result. The encrypted databases with L2 or L3 leakage
profiles are vulnerable to this attack. Although some works
[16]–[19] ensure both forward and backward privacy, they are
still vulnerable to the file-injection attack due to the leakage
of access pattern. That is, after searching, the attacker could
still learn the intersections between previous insert queries and
the search result of current queries.
4) Count and Relational-count Attack: The count attack is
proposed by Cash et al. in [12] to recover encrypted queries
in file storage systems based on the access and size patterns
leakage. In [36], Abdelraheem et al. have applied this attack
to databases and named it a relational-count attack. As in the
IKK attack scenario, the CSP is also assumed to know an
m × m matrix C˜, where its entry C˜[wi, wj ] holds the co-
occurrence rate of keyword wi and wj in the targeted dataset.
In order to improve the attack efficiency and accuracy, the
CSP is assumed to know, for each keyword w, the number
of matching files count(w) in the targeted dataset. The CSP
mounts the count attack by counting the number of files
matching each encrypted query. For an encrypted query, if the
number of its matching files is unique and equals to a known
count(w), the searched keyword must be w. However, if the
result size of a query EQ is not unique, all the keywords with
count(w) = |EDB(EQ)| could be the candidates. Recall
that the CSP can construct another matrix C that represents
the observed co-occurrence rate between any two queries
based on the leakage of access pattern. By comparing C
with C˜, the candidates for the queries with non-unique result
sizes can be reduced. With enough recovered queries, it is
possible to determine the keyword of EQ. In [12], Cash et
al. tested the count attack against Enron email dataset and
successfully recovered almost all the queries. The SE solutions
for databases with leakage profiles above L1 are vulnerable to
this attack.
5) Reconstruction Attack: In ORAM-based systems, such
as SisoSPIR proposed by Ishai et al. [30], the size and access
patterns are concealed. Unfortunately, Kellaris et al. [14]
observe that the ORAM-based systems have fixed communi-
cation overhead between the CSP and users, where the length
of the message sent from the CSP to the user as the result of
a query is proportional to the number of records matching the
query. That is, for a query Q, the size of the communication
sent from the CSP to the user is α|DB(Q)|+β, where α and β
are two constants. In theory, by giving two (query, result) pairs,
the CSP can derive α and β, and then infer the result sizes of
other queries. In [14], Kellaris et al. present the reconstruction
attack that exploits the leakage of communication volume, and
could reconstruct the attribute names in encrypted databases
supporting range queries. In this attack, the CSP only needs
to know the underlying query distribution prior to the attack.
Their experiment illustrated that after a certain number of
queries, all the attributes can be recovered in a few seconds.
Since we focus on equality queries in this work, we do not give
the attack details here. Nonetheless, after recovering the size
pattern for each query, the CSP could also mount the count
attack on equality queries. The SE schemes with L1 leakage
profile are vulnerable to this attack.
IV. OVERVIEW OF P-McDb
In this work, we propose P-McDb, a multi-cloud based
dynamic SSE scheme for databases that can resist the afore-
mentioned leakage-based attacks. Specifically, our scheme not
only hides the frequency information of the database, but also
protects the size, search, and access patterns. Moreover, it
ensures both forward and backward privacy when involving
insert and delete queries. Comparing with the existing SE
solutions, P-McDb has the smallest leakage. In this section,
we define the system and threat model, and illustrate the
techniques used in P-McDb at high-level.
A. System Model
In the following, we define our system model to describe
the entities involved in P-McDb, as shown in Fig. 1:
• Admin: An admin is responsible for the setup and
maintenance of databases, user management as well as
specification and deployment of access control policies.
• User: A user can issue insert, select, delete, and update
queries to read and write the database according to
the deployed access control policies. P-McDb allows
multiple users to read and write the database.
• Storage and Search Service (SSS): It provides en-
crypted data storage, executes encrypted queries, and
returns matching records in an encrypted manner.
5User 1
User n
…
Untrusted environmentTrusted environment
Admin
CSP 2
Index & Witness
Service (IWS)
CSP 1
Storage & Search
Service (SSS)
CSP 3
Re-randomise & 
Shuffle Service 
(RSS)
Fig. 1. An overview of P-McDb: Users can upload records and issue
queries. The SSS, IWS, and RSS represent independent CSPs. The SSS stores
encrypted records and executes queries. The IWS stores index and auxiliary
information, and provides witnesses to the SSS for performing encrypted
search. After executing each query, the SSS sends searched records to the
RSS for shuffling and re-randomising to protect patterns privacy.
• Index and Witness Service (IWS): It stores the index
and auxiliary information, and provides witnesses to the
SSS for retrieving data. The IWS has no access to the
encrypted data.
• Re-randomise and Shuffle Service (RSS): After exe-
cuting each query, it re-randomises and shuffles searched
records to achieve the privacy of access pattern. The RSS
does not store any data.
Each of the SSS, IWS, and RSS is deployed on the infras-
tructure managed by CSPs that are in conflict of interest.
According to the latest report given by RightScale [37], or-
ganisations are using more than three public CSPs on average,
which means the schemes based on multi-cloud are feasible
for most organisations. The CSPs have to ensure that there is
a two-way communication between any two of them, but our
model assumes there is no collusion between the CSPs.
B. Threat Model
We assume the admin is fully trusted. All the users are only
assumed to securely store their keys and the data.
The CSPs hosting the SSS, IWS, and RSS are modelled as
honest-but-curious. More specifically, they honestly perform
the operations requested by users according to the designated
protocol specification. However, as mentioned in the above
leakage-based attacks, they are curious to gain knowledge of
records and queries by 1) analysing the outsourced data, 2)
analysing the information leaked when executing queries, 3)
and injecting malicious records. As far as we know, P-McDb
is the first SE scheme that considers active CSPs that could
inject malicious records. Moreover, as assumed in [29], [38],
[39], we also assume the CSPs do not collude. In other words,
we assume an attacker could only compromise one CSP. In
practice, any three cloud providers in conflict of interest, such
as Amazon S3, Google Drive, and Microsoft Azure, could
be considered since they may be less likely to collude in an
attempt to gain information from their customers.
We assume there are mechanisms in place for ensuring data
integrity and availability of the system.
C. Approach Overview
P-McDb aims at hiding the search, access, and size patterns.
P-McDb also achieves both backward and forward privacy. We
now give an overview of our approach.
To protect the search pattern, P-McDb XORs the query
with a nonce, making identical queries look different once
encrypted (i.e., the encrypted query is semantically secure).
However, the CSP may still infer the search pattern by looking
at the access pattern. Specifically, the CSP can infer that two
queries are equivalent if the same records are returned. To
address this issue, after executing each query, we shuffle the
locations of the searched records. Moreover, we re-randomise
their ciphertexts, making them untraceable. In this way, even
if a query equivalent to the previous one is executed, the CSP
will see a new set of records being searched and returned, and
cannot easily infer the search and access pattern.
Another form of leakage is the size pattern, where the CSP
can learn the number of records returned after performing a
query, even after shuffling and re-randomisation. Moreover,
the CSP can guess the search pattern from the size pattern.
Specifically, the queries matching different numbers of records
must be different, and the queries matching the same number
of records could be equivalent. To protect the size pattern,
we introduce a number of dummy records that look exactly
like the real ones and could match queries. Consequently, the
search result for each query will contain a number of dummy
records making it difficult for the CSP to identify the actual
number of real records returned by a query.
To break the link between size and search pattern, our
strategy is to ensure all queries always match the same number
of records, and the concrete method is to pad all the data
elements in each field into the same occurrence with dummy
records. By doing so, the size pattern is also protected from
the communication volume since there is no fixed relationship
between them. However, a large number of dummy records
might be required for the padding. To reduce required dummy
records and ensure P-McDb’s performance, we virtually divide
the distinct data elements into groups and only pad the
elements in the same group into the same occurrence. By doing
so, the queries searching values in the same group will always
match the same number of records. Then, the CSP cannot infer
their search pattern. Here we clarify that the search pattern
is not fully protected in P-McDb. Specifically, the CSP can
still tell the queries are different if their search results are in
different groups.
P-McDb also achieves forward and backward privacy. Our
strategy is to blind records also with nonces and re-randomise
them using fresh nonces after executing each query. Only
queries that include the current nonce could match records.
In this way, even if a malicious CSP tries to use previously
executed queries with old nonces, they will not be able to
match the records in the dataset, ensuring forward privacy.
Similarly, deleted records (with old nonces) will not match
newly issued queries because they use different nonces.
The details and algorithms of our scheme will be discussed
in the following section.
V. SOLUTION DETAILS
In this section, we give the details for setting up, searching,
and updating the database.
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DATA REPRESENTATION IN P-McDb
(a) Staff
Name Age
Alice 27
Anna 30
Bob 27
Bill 25
Bob 33
(b) GDB on the IWS
GID IL (E, τ)∗
(1, g1) {1, 2} ({Alice, Anna}, 1)∗
(1, g2) {3, 4, 5, 6} ({Bob,Bill}, 2)∗
(2, g′1) {1, 3, 4, 6} ({25, 27}, 2)∗
(2, g′2) {2, 5} ({30, 33}, 1)∗
(c) NDB on the IWS
id seed nonce
1 seed1 n1
2 seed2 n2
3 seed3 n3
4 seed4 n4
5 seed5 n5
6 seed6 n6
(d) EDB on the SSS
ID 1 2 Tag
1 SE(Alice) SE(27) tag1
2 SE(Anna) SE(30) tag2
3 SE(Bob) SE(27) tag3
4 SE(Bill) SE(25) tag4
5 SE(Bob) SE(33) tag5
6 SE(Bill) SE(25) tag6
(a) A sample Staff table. (b) GDB, the group information, is stored on the IWS. (c)
NDB contains the seeds used to generate nonces. It might contain the nonces directly.
NDB is also stored on the IWS. (d) EDB, the encrypted Staff table, is stored on the
SSS. Each encrypted data element SE(ef ) = Encs1 (ef )⊕ nf . Each record has a
tag, enabling users to distinguish dummy and real records. In this example, the last
record in Table (d) is dummy. The RSS does not store any data.
Algorithm 1 Setup(k,DB)
1: Admin: KeyGen
2: s1, s2 ← {0, 1}k
3: GDB ← ∅, EDB ← ∅, NDB ← ∅
4: Admin: GroupGen
5: for each field f do
6: Collect Uf and {O(e)}e∈Uf , and compute Ψf = {g ← GEs1 (e)}e∈Uf
7: for each g ∈ Ψf do
8: ILf,g ← ∅, Ef,g ← {e}e∈Uf&GEs1 (e)=g
9: τf,g ← max{|O(e)|}e∈Ef,g
10: (Ef,g, τ)∗ ← ENCs1 (Ef,g, τ)
11: GDB(f, g)← (ILf,g, (Ef,g, τf,g)∗)
12: Admin: DummyGen
13: for each field f do
14: Σf ← Σg∈ΨfΣe∈Ef,g (τf,g −O(e))
15: Σmax ← max{Σ1, . . . ,ΣF }
16: Add Σmax dummy records with values (NULL, . . . , NULL) into DB
17: for each field f do
18: for each e ∈ Uf do
19: Assign e to τf,GEs1 (e) −O(e) dummy records in field f
20: Mark real and dummy records with flag = 1 and flag = 0, respectively
21: Shuffle DB
22: Admin: DBEnc
23: id← 0
24: for each rcd ∈ DB do
25: (Ercd, seed,n, Grcd)← RcdEnc(rcd, flag)
26: EDB(id)← Ercd, NDB(id)← (seed,n)
27: for each gf ∈ Grcd do
28: ILf,g ← ILf,g ∪ id
29: id+ +
A. Setup
The system is set up by the admin by generating the secret
keys s1 and s2 based on the security parameter k. s1 is only
known to users and is used to protect queries and records from
CSPs. s2 is generated for saving storage, and it is known
to both the user and IWS and is used to generate nonces
for record and query encryption. The admin also defines the
cryptographic primitives used in P-McDb.
We assume the initial database DB is not empty. The
admin bootstraps DB with Algorithm 1, Setup(k,DB) →
(EDB,GDB,NDB). Roughly speaking, the admin divides
the records into groups (Lines 4-11), pads the elements in the
same group into the same occurrence by generating dummy
records (Lines 12-21), and encrypts each record (Lines 22-29).
The details of each operation are given below.
Group Generation. As mentioned, inserting dummy records
is necessary to protect the size and search patterns, and
grouping the data aims at reducing the number of required
dummy records.
Indeed, dividing the data into groups could also reduce the
number of records to be searched. Only padding the data in
the same group into the same occurrence could result in the
leakage of group information. Particularly, the SSS can learn if
records and queries are in the same group from the size pattern.
Considering the group information will be inevitably leaked
after executing queries, P-McDb allows the SSS to know the
group information in advance, and only search a group of
records for each query rather than the whole database. By
doing so, the query can be processed more efficiently without
leaking additional information. Yet, in this case, the SSS needs
to know which group of records should be searched for each
query. Considering the SSS only gets encrypted records and
queries, the group should be determined by the admin and
users. To avoid putting heavy storage overhead on users,
P-McDb divides data into groups with a Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) GE : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}∗. The
elements in field f (1 ≤ f ≤ F ) with the same g ← GEs1(e)
value are in the same group, and (f, g) is the group identifier.
In this way, the admin and users can easily know the group
identifiers of records and queries just by performing GE.
The implementation of GE function affects the security
level of the search pattern. Let λ stand for the number of
distinct elements contained in a group. Since the elements in
the same group will have the same occurrence, the queries
involving those elements (defined as the queries in the same
group) will match the same number of records. Then, the
adversary cannot tell their search patterns from their size
patterns. Formally, for any two queries matching the same
number of records, the probability they involve the same
keyword is 1λ . Thus, λ also represents the security level of the
search pattern. Given λ, the implementation of GE should
ensure each group contains at least λ distinct elements. For
instance, the admin could generate the group identifier of
e by computing LSBb(Hs1(e)), where LSBb gets the least
significant b bits of its input. To ensure each group contains
at least λ distinct elements, b can be smaller.
The details of grouping DB are shown in Lines 4-
11 of Algorithm 1. Formally, we define group (f, g) as
(ILf,g,Ef,g, τf,g), where ILf,g stores the identifiers of the
records in this group (Line 28), Ef,g is the set of distinct ele-
ments in this group (Line 8), and τf,g = max{O(e)|e ∈ Ef,g}
is the occurrence threshold for padding (Line 9). Since the
group information will be stored in the CSP, (Ef,g, τf,g) is
encrypted into (Ef,g, τf,g)∗ with s1 and a semantically secure
symmetric encryption primitive ENC : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}∗. (Ef,g, τf,g)∗ is necessary for insert queries (The
details are given in Section V-E).
Note that if the initial database is empty, the admin can pre-
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1: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
2: n← Γs2 (seed), where n = . . . ‖nf‖ . . . ‖nF+1, |nf | = |e| and |nF+1| =|H|+ |e|
3: for each element ef ∈ rcd do
4: gf ← GEs1 (ef )
5: e∗f ← Encs1 (ef )⊕ nf
6: if flag = 1 then
7: S $← {0, 1}|e|
8: tag ← (Hs1 (S)||S)⊕ nF+1
9: else
10: tag $← {0, 1}|H|+|e|
11: return Ercd = (e∗1 , . . . , e
∗
F , tag), (seed,n), and Grcd = (g1, . . . , gF )
define a possible Uf for each field and group its elements in
the same way. In this case, IL = ∅ and τ = 0 for each group
after the bootstrapping.
Dummy Records Generation. Once the groups are de-
termined, the next step is to generate dummy records. The
details for generating dummy records are given in Lines 12-
21, Algorithm 1. Specifically, the admin first needs to know
how many dummy records are required for the padding. Since
the admin will pad the occurrence of each element in Ef,g
into τf,g , τf,g − O(e) dummy records are required for each
e ∈ Ef,g .
Assume there are M groups in field f , then Σf =∑M
i=1
∑
e∈Ef,gi (τf,gi−O(e)) dummy records are required to-
tally for padding field f . For the database with multiple fields,
different fields might require different numbers of dummy
records. Assume Σmax = max{Σ1, . . . ,ΣF }. To ensure all
fields can be padded properly, Σmax dummy records are
required. Whereas, ∆f = Σmax−Σf dummy records will be
redundant for field f . The admin assigns them a meaningless
string, such as ‘NULL’, in field f . After encryption, ‘NULL’
will be indistinguishable from other elements. Thus, the CSP
cannot distinguish between real and dummy records. Note that
users and the admin can search the records with ‘NULL’.
In this work, we do not consider the query with conjunctive
predicates, so we do not consider to pad the element pairs also
into the same occurrence.
After padding, each record rcd is appended with a flag
to mark if it is real or dummy. Specifically, flag = 1 when
rcd is real, otherwise flag = 0. The admin also shuffles the
dummy and real records.
Record Encryption. The admin encrypts each record before
uploading them to the SSS. The details of record encryp-
tion are provided in Algorithm 2, RcdEnc(rcd, flag) →
(Ercd, seed,n, Grcd).
To ensure the dummy records could match queries, they
are encrypted in the same way as real ones. Specifically, first
the admin generates a random string as a seed for generating
a longer nonce n with a Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG)
Γ : {0, 1}|seed| × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}∗ (Line 2, Algorithm 2).
Second, the admin generates gf for each ef ∈ rcd by
computing GEs1(ef ) (Line 4). Moreover, ef is encrypted
by computing SE(ef ) : e∗f ← Encs1(ef ) ⊕ nf (Line 5),
where Enc : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}∗ is a deterministic
symmetric encryption primitive, such as AES-ECB. Using nf ,
on the one hand, ensures the semantically secure of e∗f . On
the other hand, it ensures the forward and backward privacy
of P-McDb (as explained in Section V-C). e∗f will be used for
encrypted search and data retrieval.
The dummy records are meaningless items, and the user
does not need to decrypt returned dummy records. Thus, we
need a way to filter dummy records for users. Considering
the CSPs are untrusted, we cannot mark the real and dummy
records in cleartext. Instead, we use a keyed hash value to
achieve that. Specifically, as shown in Lines 8 and 10, a tag
tag is generated using a keyed hash function H : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}∗ and the secret key s1 if the record is real,
otherwise tag is a random bit string. With the secret key s1, the
dummy records can be efficiently filtered out by users before
decrypting the search result by checking if:
tagl
?
=Hs1(tagr), where tagl||tagr = tag ⊕ nF+1
Once all the real and dummy records are encrypted, the
admin uploads the auxiliary information, i.e., the set of group
information GDB and the set of nonce information NDB,
to the IWS, and uploads encrypted records EDB to the SSS.
GDB contains (IL, (E, τ)∗) for each group. NDB contains
a (seed,n) pair for each record stored in EDB. To reduce the
storage overhead on the IWS, NDB could also just store the
seed and recover n by computing Γs2(seed) when required.
Whereas, saving the (seed,n) pairs reduces the computation
overhead on the IWS. In the rest of this article, we assume
NDB contains (seed,n) pairs. EDB contains the encrypted
record Ercd. Note that to ensure the correctness of the search
functionality, it is necessary to store the encrypted records and
their respective (seed,n) pairs in the same order in EDB
and NDB (the search operation is explained in Section V-B).
In Table III, we take the Staff table (i.e., Table III(a)) as an
example and show the details stored in GDB, NDB, and
EDB in Tables III(b), III(c), and III(d), respectively.
B. Select Query
In this work, we focus on the simple query which only
has one single equality predicate. The complex queries with
multiple predicates can be performed by issuing multiple
simple queries and combing their results on the user side.
To support range queries, the technique used in [40] can be
adopted.
For performing a select query, P-McDb requires the coop-
eration between the IWS and SSS. The details of the steps
performed by the user, IWS, and SSS are shown in Algo-
rithm 3, Query(Q) → SR, which consists of 4 components:
QueryEnc, NonceBlind, Search, RcdDec.
QueryEnc(Q)→ (EQ,η, g). First, the user encrypts the
query Q = (type, f, e) using QueryEnc (Lines 1 - 7, Algo-
rithm 3). Specifically, to determine the group to be searched,
the user first generates g (Line 2). We do not aim at protecting
the query type and searched field from CSPs. Thus, the user
does not encrypt Q.type and Q.f . The interested keyword Q.e
is encrypted into EQ.e∗ by computing Encs1(Q.e)⊕ η (Line
5). The nonce η ensures that EQ.e∗ is semantically secure.
Finally, the user sends EQ = (type, f, e∗) to the SSS and
sends (EQ.f , η, g) to the IWS.
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1: User: QueryEnc(Q)
2: g ← GEs1 (Q.e)
3: EQ.type← Q.type, EQ.f ← Q.f
4: η $← {0, 1}|e|
5: EQ.e∗ ← Encs1 (Q.e)⊕ η
6: Send EQ = (type, f, e∗) to the SSS
7: Send (EQ.f, η, g) to the IWS
8: IWS: NonceBlind(EQ.f, η, g)
9: EN ← ∅
10: IL ← GDB(EQ.f, g) {If (EQ.f, g) /∈ GDB, return IL of the closest
group(s).}
11: for each id ∈ IL do
12: (seed,n) ← NDB(id), where n = . . . ||nEQ.f || . . . and |nEQ.f | =
|η|
13: w ← H′(nEQ.f ⊕ η)
14: t← η ⊕ seed
15: EN(id)← (w, t)
16: Send IL = (id, . . .) and the encrypted nonce set EN = ((w, t), . . .) to the
SSS
17: SSS: Search(EQ,EN, IL)
18: SR← ∅
19: for each id ∈ IL do
20: if H′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕ EQ.e∗) = EN(id).w then
21: SR← SR ∪ (EDB(id), EN(id).t)
22: Send the search result SR to the user
23: User: RcdDec(SR, η)
24: for each (Ercd, t) ∈ SR do
25: n← Γs2 (t⊕ η)
26: (Encs1 (rcd), tag)← Ercd⊕ n
27: tagl||tagr ← tag, where |tagr| = |e|
28: if tagl = Hs1 (tagr) then
29: rcd← Enc−1s1 (Encs1 (rcd))
NonceBlind(EQ.f, η, g) → (IL,EN). Second, the
IWS provides IL and witnesses EN of group (EQ.f, g) to the
SSS by running NonceBlind (Line 8 - 16). Specifically, for
each id ∈ IL, the IWS generates EN(id) = (w, t) (Lines 12-
15), where w = H ′(nEQ.f ⊕ η) will be used by the SSS to
find the matching records, and t = η ⊕ seed will be used by
the user to decrypt the result. Here H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k is
a hash function. Note that when (EQ.f, g) is not contained in
GDB, IL of the closest group(s) will be used, i.e., the group
in field EQ.f whose identifier has the most common bits with
g3.
Search(EQ, IL,EN) → SR. Third, the SSS traverses
the records indexed by IL and finds the records matching
EQ with the assistance of EN (Lines 17 - 22). Specif-
ically, for each record indexed by IL, the SSS checks if
H ′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕EQ.e∗) ?= EN(id).w (Line 20). More
specifically, the operation is:
H ′(Encs1(eEQ.f )⊕nEQ.f⊕Encs1(Q.e)⊕η) ?= H ′(nEQ.f⊕η)
It is clear that only when Q.e = eEQ.f there is a match.
The SSS sends each matched record EDB(id) and its corre-
sponding EN(id).t to the user as the search result SR, i.e.,
EDB(EQ).
RcdDec(SR) → rcds. To decrypt an encrypted record
Ercd, both the secret key s1 and nonce n are required. The
nonce n can be recovered from the returned t. Only the
user issuing the query knows η and is able to recover n by
3This can be obtained by comparing the hamming weight of g′ ⊕ g for all
(EQ.f, g′) ∈ GDB.
computing Γs2(t⊕η) (Line 25). With n, the user can check if
each returned record is real or dummy (Line 28), and decrypt
each real record by computing Enc−1s1 (Ercd⊕ n) (Line 29),
where Enc−1 is the inverse of Enc.
C. Shuffling and Re-randomisation
Algorithm 4 Shuffle(IL,Ercds)
1: IWS: PreShuffle(IL)
2: IL′ ← pi(IL)
3: Shuffle the (seed,n) pairs indexed by IL based on IL′
4: Update the indices of affected groups in GDB
5: for each id ∈ IL′ do
6: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
7: n′ ← Γs2 (seed)
8: NN(id)← NDB(id).n⊕ n′
9: NDB(id)← (seed,n′)
10: Send (IL′, NN) to the RSS.
11: RSS: Shuffle(Ercds, IL′, NN)
12: Shuffle Ercds based on IL′
13: for each id ∈ IL′ do
14: Ercds(id)← Ercds(id)⊕NN(id)
15: Send Ercds to the SSS.
To protect the access pattern and ensure the forward
and backward privacy, P-McDb shuffles and re-randomises
searched records after executing each query, and this procedure
is performed by the IWS and RSS. The details are shown in
Algorithm 4, consisting of PreShuffle and Shuffle.
PreShuffle(IL) → (IL′,NN). In P-McDb, the
searched records are re-randomised by renewing the nonces.
Recall that SE encryption is semantically secure due to the
nonce. However, the IWS stores the nonces. If the IWS has
access to encrypted records, it could observe deterministically
encrypted records by removing the nonces. To void leakage,
P-McDb does not allow the IWS to access any records and
involves the RSS to shuffle and re-randomise the records.
Yet, the IWS still needs to shuffle NDB and generate new
nonces for the re-randomisation by executing PreShuffle.
Specifically, as shown in Algorithm 4, Lines 1-10, the IWS
first shuffles the ids in IL with a Pseudo-Random Permutation
(PRP) pi and gets the re-ordered indices list IL′. In our
implementation, we leverage the modern version of the Fisher-
Yates shuffle algorithm [41], where from the first id to the
last one, each id in IL is exchanged with a random id storing
behind it. After that, the IWS shuffles (seed,n) pairs based
on IL′. Note that the shuffling operation affects the list of
indices of the groups in other fields. Thus, the IWS also
needs to update the index lists of other groups accordingly
(Line 4). For re-randomising records, the IWS samples a new
seed and generates a new nonce n′. To ensure the records
will be blinded with the respective new nonces stored in
NDB after shuffling and re-randomising, the IWS generates
NN = (n ⊕ n′, . . .) for RSS (Line 8). Afterwards, IWS
updates the seed and nonce stored in NDB(id) with the new
values. Finally, (IL′, NN) is sent to the RSS.
Shuffle(Ercds, IL′,NN)→ Ercds. After searching,
the SSS sends the searched records Ercds to the RSS. Given
IL′ and NN , the RSS starts to shuffle and re-randomise
9Ercds. Specifically, the RSS first shuffles Ercds based
on IL′, and then re-randomises each record by computing
Ercds(id)⊕NN(id) (Line 14). In details, the operation is:
(Encs1(rcdid)⊕ n)⊕ (n′ ⊕ n) = Encs1(rcdid)⊕ n′
That is, Ercds(id) is blinded with the latest nonce stored
in NDB(id). Finally, the re-randomised and shuffled records
Ercds are sent back to the SSS.
By using a new set of seeds for the re-randomisation,
P-McDb achieves both forward and backward privacy. If the
SSS tries to execute an old query individually, it will not be
able to match any records without the new witness w, which
can only be generated by the IWS with new nonces. Similarly,
the SSS cannot learn if deleted records match new queries.
D. User Revocation
P-McDb supports flexible multi-user access in a way that
the issued queries and search results of one user are protected
from all the other entities. Moreover, revoking users do not
require key regeneration and data re-encryption even when
one of the CSPs colludes with revoked users.
As mentioned in Section V-B, for filtering dummy records
and recovering returned real records, both s1 and the nonce
are required. After shuffling, the nonce is only known to the
IWS. Thus, without the assistance of the IWS and SSS, the
user is unable to recover records only with s1. Therefore, for
user revocation, we just need to manage a revoked user list at
the IWS as well as at the SSS. Once a user is revoked, the
admin informs the IWS and SSS to add this user into their
revoked user lists. When receiving a query, the IWS and the
SSS will first check if the user has been revoked. If yes, they
will reject the query. In case revoked users collude with either
the SSS or IWS, they cannot get the search results, since such
operation requires the cooperation of both the user issuing the
query, IWS, and SSS.
E. Database Updating
P-McDb allows users to update the database after bootstrap-
ping. However, after updating, the occurrences of involved
elements will change. To effectively protect the search pattern,
we should ensure the elements in the same group always
have the same occurrence. P-McDb achieves that by updating
dummy records.
Insert Query. In P-McDb, the insert query is also performed
with the cooperation of the user, IWS, and SSS. The idea is
that a number of dummy records will be generated and inserted
with the real one to ensure all the elements in the same group
always have the same occurrence. The details are shown in
Algorithm 5.
Assume the real record to be inserted is rcd =
(e1, . . . , eF ). The user encrypts it with RcdEnc, and gets
(Ercd, seed,n, Grcd) (Line 2, Algorithm 5). For each gf ∈
Grcd, the user gets (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗ of group (f, gf ) and
decrypts it. Note that if (f, gf ) /∈ GDB, the IWS returns
(Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗ of the closest group(s), instead of adding a
new group. That is, ef will belong to its closet group in this
Algorithm 5 Insert(rcd)
1: User(rcd):
2: (Ercd, seed,n, Grcd)← RcdEnc(rcd, 1)
3: INSIWS ← (seed,n, Grcd), INSSSS ← Ercd
4: for each gf ∈ Grcd do
5: (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗ ← GDB(f, gf ){If (f, gf ) /∈ GDB, gf ← g′f , where
(f, g′f ) is the closet group of (f, gf ).}
6: (Ef,gf , τf,gf )← ENC−1s1 ((Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗)
7: for each ef ∈ rcd do
8: if ef ∈ Ef,gf then
9: γf ← |Ef,gf | − 1
10: else
11: γf ← τf,gf − 1
12: W = max{γf}1≤f≤F
13: Generate W dummy records with values (NULL, . . . , NULL)
14: for each ef ∈ rcd do
15: if ef ∈ Ef,gf then
16: Assign Ef,gf \ ef to γf dummy records in field f
17: τf,gf + +
18: else
19: Assign ef to γf dummy records in field f
20: Ef,gf ← Ef,gf ∪ ef
21: (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗ ← ENCs1 (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
22: for each dummy record rcd′ do
23: (Ercd, seed,n, Grcd)← RcdEnc(rcd′, 0)
24: INSIWS ← INSIWS ∪ (seed,n, Grcd)
25: INSSSS ← INSSSS ∪ Ercd
26: Send INSIWS and ((Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗)1≤f≤F to the IWS
27: Send INSSSS to the SSS
28: SSS(INSSSS ):
29: IDs← ∅
30: for each Ercd ∈ INSSSS do
31: EDB(+ + id)← Ercd
32: IDs← IDs ∪ id
33: Send IDs to the IWS
34: IWS(INSIWS , (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗)1≤f≤F , IDs):
35: for each (seed,n, Grcd) ∈ INSIWS and id ∈ IDs do
36: NDB(id)← (seed,n)
37: for f = 1 to F do
38: GDB(f, gf )← (GDB(f, gf ).ILf,gf ∪ id, (Ef,gf , τf,gf )∗)
case. The problem of adding new groups is that when the new
groups contain less than λ elements, adversaries could easily
infer the search and access patterns within these groups.
The next step is to generate dummy records (Lines 7-
21). The approach of generating dummy records depends
on whether ef ∈ Ef,gf , i.e., whether rcd introduces new
element(s) that not belongs to U or not. If ef ∈ Ef,gf , after
inserting rcd, O(ef ) will increase to τf,gf + 1 automatically.
In this case, the occurrence of other elements in Ef,gf should
also be increased to τf,gf +1. Otherwise, O(ef ) will be unique
in the database, and adversaries can tell if users are querying
ef based on the size pattern. To achieve that, γf = |Ef,gf |−1
dummy records are required for field f , and each of them
contains an element in Ef,gf \ ef . If ef /∈ Ef,gf , O(ef ) = 0
in EDB. After inserting, we should ensure O(ef ) = τf,gf
since it belongs to the group (f, gf ). Thus, this case needs
γf = τf,gf −1 dummy records for field f , and all of them are
assigned with ef in field f .
Assume W dummy records are required for inserting rcd,
where W = max{γf}1≤f≤F . The user generates W dummy
records as mentioned above (‘NULL’ is used if necessary),
and encrypts them with RcdEnc (Lines 12-21). Meanwhile,
the user adds each new element into the respective Ef,gf if
there are any, updates τf,gf , and re-encrypts (Ef,gf , τf,gf ). All
the encrypted records are sent to the SSS and added into EDB
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(Lines 28-33). All the (seed,n) pairs and (Ef,gf , τf,gf )
∗ are
sent to the IWS and inserted into NDB and GDB accordingly
(Lines 34-38). Finally, to protect the access pattern, the shuf-
fling and re-randomising operations over the involved groups
will be performed between the IWS and RSS.
Delete Query. Processing delete queries is straightforward.
Instead of removing records from the database, the user
sets them to dummy by replacing their tags with random
strings. In this way, the occurrences of involved elements are
not changed. Moreover, the correctness of the search result
is guaranteed. However, only updating the tags of matched
records leaks the access pattern of delete queries to the
RSS. Particularly, the RSS could keep a view of the latest
database and check which records’ tags were modified when
the searched records are sent back for shuffling. To avoid
such leakage, in P-McDb, the user modifies the tags of all
the searched records for each delete query. Specifically, the
SSS returns the identifiers of matched records and the tags
of all searched records to the user. For matched records, the
user changes their tags to random strings directly. Whereas,
for each unmatched records, the user first checks if it is real
or dummy, and then generates a proper new tag as done in
Algorithm 2. Likewise, the PreShuffle and Shuffle algorithms
are performed between the IWS and RSS after updating all
the tags.
However, if the system never removes records, the database
will increase rapidly. To avoid this, the admin periodically re-
moves the records consisting of F ‘NULL’ from the database.
Specifically, the admin periodically checks if each element in
each group is contained in one dummy record. If yes, for each
element, the admin updates one dummy record containing it to
‘NULL’. As a consequence, the occurrence of all the elements
in the same group will decrease, but still is the same. When the
dummy record only consists of ‘NULL’, the admin removes
it from the database.
Update query. In P-McDb, update queries can be performed
by deleting the records with old elements and inserting new
records with new elements.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyse the leakage in P-McDb.
Second, we prove the patterns and forward and backward
privacy are protected against the CSPs.
A. Leakage of P-McDb
Roughly speaking, given an initial database DB and a
sequence of queries Q, the information leaked to each CSP in
P-McDb can be defined as:
L = {LSetup(DB), {LQuery(Qi) or LUpdate(Qi)}Qi∈Q}
where LSetup, LQuery, and LUpdate represent the profiles
leaked when setting up the system, executing queries and up-
dating the database, respectively. Specifically, LUpdate could
be LInsert or LDelete. In the following, we analyse the specific
information each CSP can learn from the received messages
in each phase.
LSetup. When setting up the system, for the initial database
DB, as shown in Algorithm 1, the SSS gets the encrypted
database EDB, and the IWS gets the group information
GDB and nonce information NDB. In this phase, no data
is sent to the RSS. From EDB, the SSS learns the number of
encrypted records |EDB|, the number of fields F , the length
of each element |e|, and the length of tag |tag|. From NDB
and GDB, the IWS learns |NDB| (|NDB| = |EDB|), the
length of each seed |seed|, the length of each nonce |n|
(|n| = F |e| + |tag|), the number of groups |GDB|, and the
record identifiers IL and |(E, τ)∗| of each group. In other
words, the IWS learns the group information of each record
in EDB. Therefore, in this phase, the leakage LSetup(DB)
learned by the SSS, IWS, and RSS can be respectively defined
as:
LSSSSetup(DB) ={|EDB|,Lrcd}
LIWSSetup(DB) ={|NDB|, |n|, |seed|, |GDB|,
{ILf,g, |(Ef,g, τ)∗|}(f,g)∈GDB}
LRSSSetup(DB) =∅
where Lrcd = {F, |e|, |tag|}.
LQuery. When processing queries, as mentioned in Algo-
rithm 3 and 4, the SSS gets the encrypted query EQ, IL
and encrypted nonces EN . Based on them, the SSS can
search over EDB and gets the search result SR. After
shuffling, the SSS also gets the shuffled records Ercds from
the RSS. From {EQ, IL,EN, SR,Ercds}, the SSS learns
{Q.type,Q.f, |Q.e|, IL, |w|, |t|}, where |t| = |seed|. In addi-
tion, the SSS can also infer the threshold τ (τ = |SR|) and the
number of distinct elements |E| (|E| = |IL|τ ) of the searched
group. The IWS only gets (EQ.f, g, η) from the user, from
which the IWS learns the searched field and group information
of each query, and |η| (|η| = |Q.e|). The RSS gets the searched
records Ercds, shuffled record identifies IL′, and new nonces
NN for shuffling and re-randomising. From them, the RSS
only learns |Ercd| (|Ercd| = |n|), IL and IL′. In summary,
LSSSQuery(Q) ={Q.f,Q.type, |Q.e|, Q.G, |t|, |w|}
LIWSQuery(Q) ={Q.f, g, |η|, |t|, |w|}
LRSSQuery(Q) ={|Ercd|, IL, IL′}
where the group information Q.G = {g, IL, τ, |E|}.
LUpdate. Since different types of queries are processed in
different manners, the SSS can learn if users are inserting,
deleting or updating records, i.e., Q.type. As mentioned in
Section V-E, when inserting a real record, the user generates
W dummy ones, encrypts both the real and dummy records
with RcdEnc, and sends them and their group information to
the SSS and IWS, respectively. Consequently, the SSS learns
W , which represents the threshold or the number of elements
of a group, and the IWS also learns the group information of
each record. Moreover, both the SSS and IWS can learn if
the insert query introduces new elements that not belong to U
based on |Ef,g| or |(Ef,g, τf,g)∗|. The RSS only performs the
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shuffle operation. Therefore, LInsert(Q) learned by each CSP
is
LSSSInsert(Q) ={W,Lrcd}
LIWSInsert(Q) ={Grcd, {|(Ef,g, τf,g)∗|}gf∈Grcd,W}
LRSSInsert(Q) =LRSSQuery(Q)
Delete queries are performed as select queries in P-McDb,
thus LDelete = LQuery for each CSP.
Above all,
LSSS ={|EDB|, F, |e|, |tag|, |t|, |w|
{{Qi.f,Qi.type, |Qi.e|, Qi.G} or W}Qi∈Q}
LIWS ={|NDB|, |GDB|, |n|, |seed|, |w|,
{ILf,g, |(Ef,g, τ)∗|}(f,g)∈GDB , {{Qi.f,Qi.g, |Qi.e|}
or {Grcd, {|(Ef,g, τf,g)∗|}gf∈Grcd,W}}Qi∈Q}
LRSS ={|Ercd|, {IL, IL′}Qi∈Q}
B. Proof of Security
Given the above leakage definition for each CSP, in this part,
we prove adversaries do not learn anything beyond Lcsp by
compromising the CSP csp, where csp could be the SSS, IWS,
or RSS. It is clear that adversaries cannot infer the search,
access and size patterns, and forward and backward privacy of
queries within a group from Lcsp. Therefore, proving P-McDb
only leaks Lcsp to csp indicates P-McDb protects the patterns
and ensures forward and backward privacy within groups.
To prove P-McDb indeed only leaks Lcsp to csp, we follow
the typical method of using a real-world versus ideal-world
paradigm [42]–[44]. The idea is that first we assume the CSP
csp is compromised by a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT)
honest-but-curious adversary A who follows the protocol
honestly as done by csp, but wants to learn more information
by analysing the received messages and injecting malicious
records. Second, we build two experiments: RealΠA(k) and
IdealΠA,S,L(k), where Π represents P-McDb. In Real
Π
A(k), all
the messages sent to A are generated as specified in P-McDb.
Whereas, in IdealΠA,S,L(k), all the messages are generated by
a PPT simulator S that only has access to Lcsp. That is, S
ensures A only learns the information defined in Lcsp from
received messages in IdealΠA,S,L(k). In the game, A chooses
an initial database, triggers Setup, and adaptively issues select,
insert, and delete queries of its choice. In response, either
RealΠA(k) or Ideal
Π
A,S,L(k) is invoked to process the database
and queries. Based on the received messages, A distinguishes
if they are generated by RealΠA(k) or Ideal
Π
A,S,L(k). If A can-
not distinguish that with non-negligible advantage, it indicates
RealΠA(k) has the same leakage profile as Ideal
Π
A,S,L(k).
Definition 6. We say the dynamic SSE scheme is L-adaptively-
secure against the CSP csp, with respect to the leakage
function Lcsp, if for any PPT adversary issuing a polynomial
number of queries, there exists a PPT simulator S, such
that RealΠA(k) and Ideal
Π
A,S,L(k) are distinguishable with
negligible probability negl(k).
Herein, we acknowledge that P-McDb leaks the group
information of queries and records and leaks whether the
elements involved in select, insert and delete queries belong to
U or not. For clarity, in the proof we assume there is only one
group in each field, and omit the group processing. Moreover,
we assume all the queries issued by A only involve elements
in U . In this case, the leakage learned by each CSP can be
simplified into:
LSSS ={|EDB|, F, |e|, |tag|, |t|, |w|
{{Qi.f,Qi.type, |Qi.e|} or W}Qi∈Q}
LIWS ={|NDB|, |n|, |seed|, |w|, {|(Ef , τ)∗|}f∈[1,F ],
{Qi.f or W}Qi∈Q}
LRSS ={|Ercd|, {IL′}Qi∈Q}
Theorem 1. If Γ is secure PRF, pi is a secure PRP, and H ′ is
a random oracle, P-McDb is a L-adaptively-secure dynamic
SSE scheme against the SSS.
Proof. To argue the security, as done in [42]–[44], we
prove through a sequence of games. The proof begins with
RealΠA(k), which is exactly the real protocol, and constructs
a sequence of games that differ slightly from the previous
game and show they are indistinguishable. Eventually we
reach the last game IdealΠA,S(k), which is simulated by a
simulator S based on the defined leakage profile LSSS . By the
transitive property of the indistinguishability, we conclude that
RealΠA(k) is indistinguishable from Ideal
Π
A,S(k) and complete
our proof. Since RcdDec is unrelated to CSPs, it is omitted
in the games. Game G1: Comparing with RealΠA(k), the
Algorithm 6 RealΠA(k).RcdEnc(rcd, flag) ‖ G1 , G2 , G3
1: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
2: n← Γs2 (seed) C G1: n← Nonce[seed] , where n = . . . ‖ nf ‖ . . . ‖
nF+1, |nf | = |e| and |nF+1| = |tag|
3: for each element ef ∈ rcd do
4: e∗f ← Encs1 (ef )⊕ nf C G3: e∗f ← {0, 1}|e|
5: if flag = 1 then
6: S $← {0, 1}|e|
7: tag ← (Hs1 (S)||S)⊕ nF+1 C G3: tag ← {0, 1}|tag|
8: else
9: tag $← {0, 1}|tag|
10: return Ercd = (e∗1 , . . . , e
∗
F , tag) and (seed,n)
difference in G1 is that the PRF Γ for generating nonces,
in RcdEnc and PreShuffle algorithms, is replaced with a
mapping Nonce. Specifically, as shown in Algorithm 6 and
8, for each unused seed (the length of seed is big enough), a
random string of length F |e|+ |tag| is generated as the nonce,
stored in Nonce, and then reused thereafter. This means that all
of the n are uniform and independent strings. In this case, the
adversarial distinguishing advantage between RealΠA(k) and
G1 is exactly the distinguishing advantage between a truly
random function and PRF. Thus, this change made negligible
difference between between RealΠA(k) and G1, i.e.,
|Pr[RealΠA(k) = 1]− Pr[G1 = 1]| ≤ negl(k)
where Pr[G = 1] represents the probability of that the
messages received by A are generated by G.
Game G2: From G1 to G2, w is replaced with a random
string, rather than generated via H ′. However, it is necessary
12
Algorithm 7 RealΠA(k).Query(Q) ‖ G1 , G2 , G3
1: User: QueryEnc(Q)
2: EQ.type← Q.type, EQ.f ← Q.f
3: η $← {0, 1}|e|
4: EQ.e∗ ← Encs1 (Q.e)⊕ η C G3: EQ.e∗ ← {0, 1}|e|
5: Send EQ = (type, f, op, e∗) to the SSS
6: Send (EQ.f, η) to the IWS
7: IWS: NonceBlind(EQ.f, η)
8: EN ← ∅
9: G2: Randomly put τf record identifiers into I
10: for each id ∈ NDB do
11: (seed,n) ← NDB(id), where n = . . . ||nEQ.f || . . . and |nEQ.f | =
|η| C Deleted in G2
12: w ← H′(nEQ.f⊕η)C G2:
if id ∈ I
wid ← H′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕EQ.e∗)
else
wid ← {0, 1}|w|
13: t← η ⊕ seed C G3: t← {0, 1}|seed|
14: EN(id)← (w, t)
15: Send the encrypted nonce set EN = ((w, t), . . .) to the SSS
16: SSS: Search(EQ,EN)
17: SR← ∅
18: for each id ∈ EDB do
19: if H′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕ EQ.e∗) = EN(id).w then
20: SR← SR ∪ (EDB(id), EN(id).t)
21: Send the search result SR to the user
Algorithm 8 RealΠA(k).Shuffle() ‖ G1 , G2 , G3
1: IWS: PreShuffle()
2: IL′ ← pi(NDB)
3: for each id ∈ IL′ do
4: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
5: n′ ← Γs2 (seed) C G1: n′ ← Nonce[seed]
6: NN(id)← NDB(id).n⊕ n′ C G3: NN(id)← {0, 1}|n|
7: NDB(id)← (seed,n′)
8: Send (IL′, NN) to the RSS.
9: RSS: Shuffle(Ercds, IL′, NN)
10: Shuffle Ercds based on IL′
11: for each id ∈ IL′ do
12: Ercds(id)← Ercds(id)⊕NN(id) C G3: Ercds(id)← {0, 1}|n|
13: Send Ercds to the SSS.
to ensure A gets τf matched records after searching over
EDB, since that is the leakage A learns, where τf is the
threshold of the searched field. To achieve that, the experi-
ment randomly picks τf witnesses and programs their values.
Specifically, as shown in Algorithm 7, the experiment first
randomly picks a set of record identifiers I , where |I| = τf .
Second, for each identifier id ∈ I , the experiment programs
wid ← H ′(EDB(id, EQ.f) ⊕ EQ.e∗). By doing so, the
records identified by I will match the query. For the identifier
id /∈ I , wid ← {0, 1}|w|.
The only difference between G2 and G1 is the generation
of w. In the following, we see if A can distinguish the two
games based on w. In G2,
For id ∈ I, wid ← H ′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕ EQ.e∗)
For id /∈ I, wid ← {0, 1}|w|
Recall that in G1.
wid ← H ′(nEQ.f ⊕ η)
In G1, nEQ.f and η are random strings. In G2, due to
the one-time pad encryption in RcdEnc and QueryEnc,
EDB(id, EQ.f) and EQ.e∗ are indistinguishable from ran-
dom strings. Thus, we can say for id ∈ I wid is generated in
the same way as done in G1. For id /∈ I , wid is a random string
in G2, whereas in G1 wid is generated by deterministic H ′. It
seems A could easily distinguish G2 and G1, since G1 outputs
the same w for the same input, whereas G2 does not. Indeed,
in G1 the inputs to H ′, nEQ.f and η, are random strings, thus
the probability of getting the same input for H ′ is negligible,
making H ′ indistinguishable from a uniform sampling. Thus,
in both cases wid in G2 is indistinguishable from wid in G1.
Next, we discuss if A can distinguish the two games based
on SR. The leakage of SR includes the identifier of each
matched records and |SR|. Due to the padding, |SR| =
|I| = τf , which means the two games are indistinguishable
based on |SR|. In G1, the identifiers of matched records
are determined by the shuffle operations performed for the
previous query. In G2, the identifiers of matched records are
randomly picked. Thus, the distinguishing advantage between
G1 and G2 based on the identifiers is exactly the distinguishing
advantage between a truly random permutation and PRP,
which is negligible.
Above all, we have
|Pr[G2 = 1]− Pr[G1 = 1]| ≤ negl(k)
Game G3: The difference between G2 and G3 is that all the
XORing operations, such as the generation of e∗, Q.e∗, and
t, are replaced with randomly sampled strings (The details are
shown in Algorithms 6, 7, and 8). Since sampling a fixed-
length random string is indistinguishable from the one-time
pad encryption, we have
Pr[G3 = 1] = Pr[G2 = 1]
Algorithm 9 S.RcdEnc(Lrcd)
1: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
2: n← Nonce[seed]
3: for each f ∈ [1, F ] do
4: e∗f ← {0, 1}|e|
5: tag $← {0, 1}|tag|
6: return Ercd = (e∗1 , . . . , e
∗
F , tag) and (seed,n)
IdealΠA,S,L(k): From G3 to the final game, we just replace the
inputs to RcdEnc, Query and Shufle algorithms with LSSS .
Moreover, for clarity, we fade the operations unrelated to the
SSS. From Algorithms 9, 10, and 11, it is easy to observe that
the messages sent to A, i.e., {Ercd,EQ,EN,Ercds}, can be
easily simulated by only relying on LSSS . Here we have:
Pr[IdealΠA,S,L(k) = 1] = Pr[G3 = 1]
By combining all the distinguishable advantages above, we
get:
|Pr[IdealΠA,S,L(k) = 1]− Pr[RealΠA(k) = 1]| < negl(k)
In IdealΠA,S,L(k), A only learns Lrcd and LSSSQuery. The
negligible advantage of a distinguisher between RealΠA(k) and
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Algorithm 10 S.Query(LSSSQuery)
1: User: QueryEnc(LSSSQuery)
2: EQ.type← Q.type, EQ.f ← Q.f
3: η $← {0, 1}|e|
4: EQ.e∗ ← {0, 1}|e|
5: Send EQ = (type, f, op, e∗) to the SSS
6: Send (EQ.f, η) to the IWS
7: IWS: NonceBlind(LSSSQuery)
8: EN ← ∅
9: Randomly put τf records identifers into I
10: for each id ∈ [1, |EDB|] do
11: if id ∈ I then
12: w ← H′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕ EQ.e∗)
13: else
14: w ← {0, 1}|w|
15: t← {0, 1}|seed|
16: EN(id)← (w, t)
17: Send the encrypted nonce set EN = ((w, t), . . .) to the SSS
18: SSS: Search(EQ,EN)
19: SR← ∅
20: for each id ∈ EDB do
21: if H′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕ EQ.e∗) = EN(id).w then
22: SR← SR ∪ (EDB(id), EN(id).t)
23: Send the search result SR to the user
Algorithm 11 S.Shuffle(LSSSQuery)
1: IWS: PreShuffle()
2: IL′ ← RP (NDB)
3: for each id ∈ IL′ do
4: seed $← {0, 1}|seed|
5: n′ ← Nonce[seed]
6: NN(id)← {0, 1}|n|
7: NDB(id)← (seed,n′)
8: Send (IL′, NN) to the RSS.
9: RSS: Shuffle(LSSSQuery)
10: Shuffle Ercds based on IL′
11: for each id ∈ IL do
12: Ercds(id)← {0, 1}|n|
13: Send Ercds to the SSS.
IdealΠA,S,L(k) indicates that P-McDb also only leaks Lrcd and
LSSSQuery.
Although the above simulation does not include the Setup
and updating phases, it is clear that the two phases mainly
rely on RcdEnc algorithm, which has been proved only leaks
Lrcd to the SSS. From Setup phase, A only gets EDB, and
each record in EDB is encrypted with RcdEnc. Thus, A only
learns |EDB| and Lrcd in this phase. Similarly, A only gets
W + 1 encrypted records in Insert algorithm. Therefore, in
addition to Lrcd, it only learns W , which is equal to |E| or τ
of a group. For delete queries, A learns LSSSQuery since they are
first performed as select queries. As proved above, the tags are
indistinguishable from random strings, meaning the returned
tags do not leak additional information.
Theorem 2. If ENC is semantically secure, P-McDb is a
L-adaptively-secure dynamic SSE scheme against the IWS.
Proof. Herein, we also assume all the records are in one group.
In this case, the IWS gets (seed,n) for each record and
(Ef , τf )
∗ for each field when setting up the database, gets
(Q.f, η) when executing queries, and gets updated (Ef , τf )∗
when inserting records. Note that the IWS can generate n
by itself since it has the key s2. Considering seed and η
are random strings, from RealΠA(k) to Ideal
Π
A,S,L(k) we just
need one step. Specifically, given LIWS , in IdealΠA,S,L(k), S
just needs to simulate (Ef , τf )∗ with |(Ef , τf )∗|-bit random
strings in Setup and Insert algorithms. Given ENC is
semantically secure, we have
|Pr[IdealΠA,S,L(k) = 1]− Pr[RealΠA(k) = 1]| < negl(k)
Theorem 3. P-McDb is a L-adaptively-secure dynamic SSE
scheme against the RSS.
Proof. In P-McDb, the RSS is only responsible for shuffling
and re-randomising records after each query. For the shuffling
and re-randomising, it gets encrypted records, IL′ and NN .
Here we also just need one step to reach IdealΠA,S,L(k).
Given LRSS , as done in the above Game G3, S needs to
replace e∗ and tag in RcdEnc with |e|-bit and |tag|-bit
random strings respectively and simulate each element in
NN with a |Ercd|-bit random string in PreShuffle. As
mentioned, since sampling a fixed-length random string is
indistinguishable from the one-time pad encryption, we have
|Pr[IdealΠA,S,L(k) = 1] = Pr[RealΠA(k) = 1]|
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We implemented P-McDb in C using MIRACL 7.0 library
for cryptographic primitives. The performance of all the en-
tities was evaluated on a desktop machine with Intel i5-4590
3.3 GHz 4-core processor and 8GB of RAM. We evaluated the
performance using TPC-H benchmark [45], and tested equality
queries with one singe predicates over ‘O CUSTKEY’ field in
‘ORDERS’ table. In the following, all the results are averaged
over 100 trials.
A. Group Generation
TABLE IV
THE STORAGE OVERHEAD WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF GROUPS
#Groups #Dummy records #Elements in a group #Records in a group
1 2599836 99996 =4099836
10 2389842 10000 ≈38000
100 1978864 1000 ≈35000
1000 1567983 100 ≈3000
10000 1034007 10 ≈240
In ‘ORDERS’ table, all the ‘O CUSTKEY’ elements are
integers. For simplicity, we divided the records into groups
by computing e mod b for each element e in ‘O CUSTKEY’
field. Specifically, we divide the records into 1, 10, 100, 1000,
and 10000 groups by setting b =1, 10, 100, 1000, and 10000,
respectively.
Table IV shows the number of required records and the
number of elements included in a group when dividing the
database into 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 10000 groups. In particular,
when all the records are in one group, 2599836 dummy records
are required in total, λ = 99996, and the CSP has to search
4099836 records for each query. When we divide the records
into more groups, fewer dummy records are required, fewer
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records will be searched by the CSP, but fewer elements will
be contained in each group. When there are 10000 groups,
only 1034007 dummy records are required totally, λ = 10,
and the CSP just needs to search around 240 records for each
query.
B. Query Latency
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Fig. 2. The overhead on different entities with different group numbers
An important aspect of an outsourced service is that most of
the intensive computations should be off-loaded to the CSPs.
To quantify the workload on each of the entities, we measured
the latency on the user, IWS, SSS, and RSS for processing
the query with different numbers of groups. The results are
shown in Fig. 2. We can notice that the computation times
taken on the IWS, SSS, and RSS are much higher than that
on the user side when there are less than 10000 groups. In the
following, we will discuss the performance on CSPs and the
user in details.
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Fig. 3. The overhead on CSPs with different group numbers
1) Overhead on CSPs: Fig. 3 shows the performance of the
operations running in the CSPs when increasing the number
of groups. Specifically, in P-McDb, the IWS runs NonceBlind
and PreShuffle, the SSS runs Search, and the RSS runs Shuffle
algorithms. We can notice that the running times of all the four
operations reduce when increasing the number of groups. The
reason is that P-McDb only searches and shuffles a group of
records for each query. The more groups, the fewer records in
each group for searching and shuffling. Thanks to the efficient
XOR operation, even when g = 1, i.e., searching the whole
database (contains 4099836 records in total), NonceBlind,
Search, and Shuffle can be finished in around 2 seconds.
PreShuffle is the most expensive operation in P-McDb, which
takes about 11 seconds when g = 1. Fortunately, in PreShuffle,
the generation of new nonces (i.e., Lines 6-7 in Algorithm 4)
is not affected by the search operation, thus they can be pre-
generated. By doing so, PreShuffle can be finished in around
2.4 seconds when g = 1.
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Fig. 4. The overhead on the user with different group numbers
2) Overhead on Users: In P-McDb, the user only encrypts
queries and decrypts results. In Fig. 4, we show the effect on
the two operations when we change the number of groups. The
time for encrypting the query does not change with the number
of groups. However, the time taken by the result decryption
decreases slowly when increasing the number of groups. For
recovering the required records, in P-McDb, the user first fil-
ters out the dummy records and then decrypts the real records.
Therefore, the result decryption time is affected by the number
of returned real records as well as the dummy ones. In this
experiment, the tested query always matches 32 real records.
However, when changing the number of groups, the number
of returned dummy records will be changed. Recall that, the
required dummy records for a group is
∑
e∈Ef,g (τf,g−O(e)),
and the threshold τf,g = max{O(e)}e∈Ef,g . When the records
are divided into more groups, fewer elements will be included
in each group. As a result, the occurrence of the searched
element tends to be closer to τf,g, and then fewer dummy
records are required for its padding. Thus, the result decryption
time decreases with the increase of the group number. In the
tested dataset, the elements have very close occurrences, which
ranges from 1 to 41. The number of matched dummy records
are 9, 9, 2, 1, and 0 when there are 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 10000
groups, respectively. For the dataset with a bigger element
occurrence gap, the result decryption time will change more
obviously when changing the number of groups.
3) End-to-end Latency: Fig. 4 also shows the end-to-end
latency on the user side when issuing a query. In this test,
we did not simulate the network latency, so the end-to-end
latency shown here consists of the query encryption time,
the nonce blinding time, the searching time and the result
decrypting time. The end-to-end latency is dominated by the
nonce blinding and searching times, thus it decreases when
increasing the number of groups. Specifically, the end-to-end
query decreases from 2.16 to 0.0006 seconds when the number
of groups increases from 1 to 10000.
In this test, we used one trick to improve the perfor-
mance. As described in Algorithm 3, the SSS is idle before
getting (IL,EN). Indeed, the IWS can send IL to the
SSS first, and then the SSS can pre-compute tempid =
15
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different result sizes
H ′(EDB(id, EQ.f)⊕EQ.e∗) while the IWS generating EN .
After getting EN , the SSS just needs to check if tempid =
EN(id).w. By computing (w, t) and temp simultaneously,
the user can get the search result more efficiently. In this test,
the SSS computed t simultaneously when the IWS generating
EN . Note that the shuffle operation does not affect the end-
to-end latency on the user side since it is performed after
returning search results to users.
C. Insert and Delete Queries
Since P-McDb is a dynamic SE scheme, we also tested its
performance for insert and delete queries.
In Fig. 5, we show the execution times of insert and delete
when changing the number of groups4. Moreover, we take
the end-to-end latency of select queries as the baseline. Fig.
5 shows both insert and delete queries execute faster when
there are more groups. For insert queries, as mentioned in
Section V-E, W = max{γf}1≤f≤F dummy records should be
inserted when inserting a real record. Thus, the performance
of insert queries is affected by the number of elements in
involved groups. When the database is divided into more
groups, the fewer elements will be included in each group. In
this experiment, when there are 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 10000
groups, the user has to generate and encrypt 99996, 10000,
1000, 100, and 10 dummy records, respectively. Specifically,
when there is only one group, P-McDb takes only around 1.5
seconds to encrypt and insert 99997 records, which is slightly
better than select queries.
4The times taken by the PreShuffle and Shuffle algorithms are not
included.
For delete queries, P-McDb first performs the search opera-
tion to get the matched records, and then turn them to dummy
by changing the tags. Moreover, to hide the access pattern
from the RSS, the user also needs to change the tags of all
the other searched records. The more groups, the fewer records
should be searched, and the fewer tags should be changed.
Therefore, the performance of delete queries also gets better
when there are more groups. However, comparing with select
queries, delete queries takes much longer time to change the
tags. Specifically, it takes around 20 seconds to execute a
delete query when there is only one group.
We also tested how the result size affects the performance of
select and delete queries. For this test, we divided the database
into 10 groups, and the searched group contains 360000
records. Moreover, we manually changed the data distribution
in the group to be searched to ensure that we can execute
queries matching 36, 360, 3600, 36000, 360000 records. From
Fig. 6, we can see that the performance of delete queries is
better when the result size is bigger. The reason is that tags
of matched records are processed in a much efficient way
than unmatched records. Specifically, as mentioned in Section
V-E, the user directly changes the tags of matched records
to random strings. However, for each unmatched record, the
user first has to detect if it is dummy or not, and then update
their tags accordingly. When all the searched records match
the delete query, it takes only 0.6 seconds to turn them to
dummy. Nonetheless, select queries take longer time when
more records matching the query, since there are more records
should be processed on the user side.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we presented the leakage profile definitions
for searchable encrypted relational databases, and investigated
the leakage-based attacks proposed int the literature. We also
proposed P-McDb, a dynamic searchable encryption scheme
for multi-cloud outsourced databases. P-McDb does not leak
information about search, access, and size patterns. It also
achieves both forward and backward privacy, where the CSPs
cannot reuse cached queries for checking if new records have
been inserted or if records have been deleted. P-McDb has
minimal leakage, making it resistant to exiting leakage-based
attacks.
As future work, first we will do our performance analysis by
deploying the scheme in the real multi-cloud setting. Second,
we will try to address the limitations of P-McDb. Specifically,
P-McDb protects the search, access, and size patterns from
the CSPs. However, it suffers from the collusion attack among
CSPs. In P-McDb, the SSS knows the search result for each
query, and the other two knows how the records are shuffled
and re-randomised. If the SSS colludes with the IWS or RSS,
they could learn the search and access patterns. We will also
consider the techniques to defend the collusion attack among
CSPs. Moreover, in this work, we assume all the CSPs are
honest. Yet, in order to learn more useful information, the
compromised CSPs might not behave honestly as assumed in
the security analysis. For instance, the SSS might not search
all the records indexed by IL, and the RSS might not shuffle
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the records properly. In the future, we will give a mechanism
to detect if the CSPs honestly follow the designated protocols.
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